![]() In respect to the specific conception of instantiation as identity of aspects, it will be pointed out that the theory implies the complete identity of universals and particulars that instantiate them and, further, that it implies the identity of everything with everything. The necessity of aspectual identity raises concerns about the stability of the view. ![]() In general: (i) it is not clear how to distinguish objective aspects from the mere forms in which we conceive an entity (ii) it is not clear what are the conditions of identity of an aspect and (iii) although the necessity of identity is rejected in general, it reappears as necessity of ‘aspectual’ identity. Several difficulties are presented, both to the general metaphysics of aspects, and to the conception of instantiation as identity of aspects. Baxter uses them to solve the problem of the multi-location of universals, temporary intrinsics and trans-world identity, besides the nature of instantiation. Hence, aspects offer ways to deal with seemingly incoherent attributions to the same entity. The attributions of one aspect are not also attributions to the other aspects of the same entity. Rejection of the principle of indiscernibility of identicals is crucial to this theory. Aspects, nonetheless, are not mere ways in which one can conceive an entity. Aspects are numerically identical with the entity to which they pertain and with the other aspects of the same entity. Aspects are presented in the form where x is filled by the entity to which the aspect pertains and ϕ is filled by the respect in which the entity in question is considered. The proposed solution requires an ontology of ‘aspects’ in order to work. ![]() The theory seems to offer a solution to the vexed question of Bradley’s Regress, because instantiation is no longer conceived as a relation between numerically different entities. ![]() Attention will be paid mostly to Baxter’s presentation, which seems the best developed, and where instantiation is understood as identity of ‘aspects’ of a universal and a particular. The theory has been previously proposed in two different guises by Baxter and Armstrong. This work presents and discusses the conception of instantiation as ‘partial identity’. By addressing both the reasons to believe in universals, and the alleged reasons not to believe in universals, it is hoped that a coherent case for realism is achieved. These are the problems arising from the realist’s obligation to ascribe referential function to predicates, and the family of difficulties known as ‘‘Bradley’s Regress’’. The second half of the thesis defends the realist against the most serious objections to an ontology of universals. This argument is defended against nominalist responses, first, that our apparent ‘ontological commitment’ to features and characteristics is not genuine and second, that the same theoretical work can be achieved by treating respects of sameness as sets of particulars or sets of tropes rather than sui generis universals. Here it is claimed that universals are needed in our ontology to serve as the respects in which things are the same, and the features or characteristics that things have in common. The first half presents a positive case for realism. This thesis argues for realism about universals - the view that, in addition to particular things, there exist universals instantiated by those particular things.
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